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KGB collaborators of all stripes, not enough has been said about them


Be they known as informers, snitches, agents, trustees, they haven't had the attention, been studied or exposed sufficiently. Eminent scholar Jüri Saar has made some pertinent observations about this part of the Soviet clandestine sector.

A persistent myth has been the perceived equivalency between the Soviet (Russian) secret services and their counterpart in the West. Intelligence services personnel in the West have never enjoyed a privileged position in society like the "nomenklatuura", a Russian tradition. In an open society no emphasis is placed on developing a vast network of informants. In the west clandestine activity is not seen in a positive light by the mass media (as per the NSA) and stress is put on the strengthening of parliamentary watchdog committees. Western societies generally recognize the benefits accruing to intelligence services (anti-terrorism fight), but still object to the sometimes illegal nature of the activity.
www.wikipedia.org

In the west, the average citizen probably never is exposed to state security activity or its players. One is more likely to experience the power of a traffic policeman, a tax auditor etc. People involved with intelligence, unobtrusive measures are more likely to be found in books and, movies. In totalitarian societies the secret services and the ‘everyday world' are intrinsically mixed. One constantly feels the presence of the clandestine world which often generates anxiety but also often excites.

The Soviet KGB wasn't an intelligence or counterintelligence agency in the traditional sense and this is reflected in the structure of the organization which actually is a mirror image of the Communist party's pyramid structure. Both had to be represented in all regions, establishments, firms, organizations etc. But their actual activity had to be unobtrusive to witnesses. When in the beginning the security apparatus dominated as a power position, over time the party took the lead and ideologues started to take leadership with all eventually reporting to the communist party central committee and its politburo. All KGB officers were party members, followed the party's discipline and were directly/indirectly subordinate to the party's first secretary.

Under Soviet KGB directives in 1952 and 1953 party, municipal, trade union, comsomol; personnel are not to be used as security forces' agents. The KGB protested arguing those restrictions weaken the effectiveness of the secret police. But basic legislation in 1959 strengthened party control over the KGB. Recruitment of party workers, leading nomenklatuura members, members of local and national soviets, armed forces command levels, military politruks, judges or prosecuters was forbidden. It was likely that the party feared the infiltration of the KGB into the above structures to take control.

The party's existence was ideally clandestine in nature and party activities were not to attract attention in society. The power that the party yielded relied on the omniscient presence of the secret police throughout the population. The KGB was the armed vanguard of the state and the party ready to battle both domestic and foreign enemies. This type of subordinated power is impossible in an open political system and perhaps even in a totalitarian society without the investment of enormous, socially intolerable resources.

Foreigners were not to be totally trusted. This meant that foreigners who were recruited, agents of influence, foreign deserters and useful idiots will forever remain foreign. Even foreign traitors whose contribution to the Soviets had been substantial did not receive the trust and care they expected. For instance Kim Philby did not in actuality have a polkovnik's (colonel's) standing as he was led to believe and remained in a type of house arrest until death. Whether Herman Simm eventually also experiences similar circumstances will be interesting to witness. Often those that have arrived in Moscow in exchanges from the West have been given a hero's welcome but in reality they have never been able to become one of their own. They Edward Snowden case should be recognized for what it is – Putin's personal largesse in giving Snowden a political refuge but still keeping him at a stranger's distance.

The Soviet heritage has passed on the myth of secret services, ‘intelligence services', security apparatus of being crowned with a special patriotic halo. It affects people at the emotional level. In the Russian/Soviet archetype nobody belittles, ridicules or vulgarizes the KGB , SVR or FSB. Their work is understood as a defence against danger from abroad while domestically it could mean a suspicious eye being focussed one oneself. The KGB enjoyed a reputation as an omnipresent, efficient, all-knowing entity free of corruption. People compared this to the bribery ridden other government departments satiated with its abuse of power. The secret services in contrast were said to be manned by the best of the best who were compensated accordingly. People understood that the KGB could be brutal and cruel, but in a deeper sense they were seen as righteous crusaders.

Laas Leivat (To be cont'd.)

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